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IV, STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether a release from liability arising 
from an automobile accident that identifies by name the 
automobile's insured who was not involved in the 
accident applies to the driver of the automobile whose 
name does not appear in the Release. Preserved in 
Record at 36-37, 91-100. 
Issue 2: Whether a release from liability arising 
from an automobile accident that identifies by names 
the automobile's insured who was not involved in the 
accident is ambiguous as it relates to the automobile's 
driver whose name does not appear in the Release; and, 
if so, whether an issue of material fact prevents 
summary enforcement of the Release. Preserved in 
Record at 95-9 6. 
Standard of Review: "Generally, a trial court's 
summary enforcement of a settlement agreement will not 
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was 
an abuse of discretion." John Deere Co. v. A & H 
Eguipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.) 
1 
(internal quotations & citations omitted), cert. 
denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994). "In addition, 
whether contractual language is ambiguous is a question 
of law, also reviewed for correctness." Id. This 
Court will affirm "a trial court's grant of a motion 
for summary judgment on any reasonable legal basis even 
if not relied on below." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l 
Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). (emphasis added). 
The Court, however, will not reverse a trial court 
based on evidence or an argument that was not first 
raised with the trial court. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. 
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional 
provisions, statutory provisions, ordinances, rules or 
regulations. Thornock has identified Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-42 as determinative, but does not rely on that 
section in any of her arguments. We disagree with 
Thornock's characterization of section 78-27-42 for the 
reasons set forth in our Argument section below. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident on 
November 15, 1993 between appellant Bonnie Thornock and 
2 
appellee Dorothy Jensen. Record at 1-2, 23. The 
accident occurred at the intersection of 9000 South and 
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. Record at 1-2, 26, 
35. 
At the time of the accident, Dorothy Jensen was 
driving a car insured through an insurance policy 
issued in the name of her husband, Lowell Jensen. 
Record at 23, 48. After the accident, Mr. Lancaster, a 
claims adjuster for the insurance company met with Ms. 
Thornock to discuss her claims against Dorothy Jensen. 
Record at 24, 48. In exchange for $469.00, Ms. 
Thornock executed a Release of All Claims ("Release") 
which is the subject of this appeal. Record at 24-26, 
48-49. 
Lowell Jensen's name appears in the Release. 
Record at 26. The Release does not refer to Dorothy 
Jensen by name. Record at 26. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In February 1996, Ms. Thornock filed suit against 
Dorothy Jensen seeking recovery for personal injuries 
sustained in the November 15, 1993 accident. Record at 
4. Ms. Jensen filed a timely Answer and subsequently 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Ms. 
Thornock released Ms. Jensen from all liability 
3 
relating to the accident when Ms. Thornock executed the 
Release. Record at 10-12, 16-26. Ms. Jensen submitted 
the Affidavit of Jim Lancaster and Supplemental 
Affidavit of Jim Lancaster in support of her motion. 
Record at 23-25, 47-49. These affidavits are 
reproduced in the attached Addendum. 
Ms. Thornock opposed the motion for summary 
judgment arguing that the Release cannot apply to 
Dorothy Jensen because her name does not appear in the 
Release. Record at 35-37. At oral argument, Ms. 
Thornock added that the Release was ambiguous and that 
Ms. Thornock's affidavit created an issue of fact 
regarding the ambiguity. Record at 95-96. 
In her affidavit, Ms. Thornock claims that she was 
under medication when she signed the Release and that 
the Release she signed was blank.1 Record at 57. (Ms. 
Thornock's affidavit is reproduced in the attached 
Addendum). Because Ms. Thornockfs affidavit was filed 
the night before oral argument, counsel for Ms. Jensen 
objected at oral argument to what he perceived to be a 
last minute attempt to infuse issues of competency into 
1
 We are not certain what Ms. Thornock means by 
"blank" and because this was never an issue below, the 
term was never clarified. We assume Ms. Thornock means 
a release in which the blanks were not yet filled in. 
4 
the case. Record at 90-91. Counsel for Thornock 
reassured counsel and the Court that the only reason he 
submitted Ms. Thornockfs affidavit was to demonstrate 
that Ms. Thornock did not intend to release anyone. 
Record at 91. No argument was made that Ms. Thornock 
was incompetent at the time that she signed the Release 
or that Mr. Lancaster tricked Ms. Thornock into signing 
the Release. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The trial court found that the Release is not 
ambiguous and the parties intended the Release to apply 
to Ms. Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen. 
Record at 69-71, 105. The trial court also found there 
was no evidence that Lowell Jensen had any liability to 
Ms. Thornock. Record at 7 0, 105. The Summary Judgment 
order is included in the Addendum to Brief of 
Appellant. 
D. FACTS RELATED TO THE ISSUES ON REVIEW 
On November 15, 199 3, Ms. Thornock and Dorothy 
Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the 
intersection of 9000 South and Redwood Road in West 
Jordan, Utah. Record at 1-2, 26, 35. Dorothy Jensen 
was driving a car insured through an insurance policy 
issued in the name of Lowell Jensen. Record at 23, 48. 
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Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband. Record at 
23, 48. Lowell Jensen was not present at the scene of 
the accident and was not involved in the automobile 
accident. Record at 23, 48. 
On November 30, 1993, Thornock met with a claims 
adjuster named Jim Lancaster to discuss the accident. 
Record at 24, 48. Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thornock 
agreed that the insurance company would pay Ms. 
Thornock $469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and 
suffering in exchange for a Release. Record at 24-26, 
The Release provides in relevant part: 
[T]he undersigned . . . for and in 
consideration of Four Hundred and Sixty-Nine 
& 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the undersigned 
in hand paid, and other good and valuable 
consideration . , . does hereby . . . 
release, acguit and forever discharge Lowell 
Jensen and his, her, their, or its agents, 
servants, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators and all other persons . . . of 
an[d] from any and all claims, actions, 
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, 
costs, loss of service, expenses, and 
compensation whatsoever, which the 
undersigned now has/have or which may 
hereafter accrue on account of or in any way 
growing out of any and all known and unknown, 
foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal 
injuries and property damage and the 
consequences thereof resulting or to result 
from the accident, casualty or event which 
occurred on or about the 15th day of Nov., 
199.3, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.[,] 
West Jordan, Ut. 
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The undersigned specifically agrees that this 
Release of All Claims releases all 
individuals, corporations, firms, 
associations or partnerships which allegedly 
could be liable for the above-references 
accident, casualty or event. It is the 
specific intention of the undersigned to 
release all parties who could be liable for 
the same. 
Record at 30 (underlined portions hand-written in 
original). 
Thornock admits to signing the Release, although 
she claims it was blank at time.2 Record at 57. She 
also admits that Mr. Lancaster came to her home to 
discuss damages from the accident with Dorothy Jensen. 
Record at 56. Thornock, however, claims that she 
"never intended to release anyone." Record at 57. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Thornock alludes to several issues not raised 
below. Issues relating to incompetence, mistake or 
fraud were not raised below, and in the case of fraud 
and mistake, were not pleaded with particularity. 
These issues are not before the Court. The issues 
2
 Appellant states that we never disputed that 
Ms. Thornock signed a "blank" release. Appellant's 
statement in unfair and inaccurate. Appellee never 
took issue with this statement below because it was 
never emphasized by appellant below. Appellant never 
argued that Mr. Lancaster tricked her into signing the 
Release. This statement was irrelevant to the 
arguments made by both parties. 
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before this Court are whether the Release applies to 
Dorothy Jensen even though her name does not appear in 
the Release, or in the alternative, whether the Release 
is ambiguous, and if so, whether there is a question of 
fact regarding the ambiguity. 
A. MS. THORNOCK RELEASED DOROTHY JENSEN 
Ms. Thornock argues that the holding in Child v. 
Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995) and that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-42 apply to the Release in this case. Child 
and section 78-27-42 carve out an exception to the 
common law with respect to releases involving multiple 
tortfeasors. They provide that a release obtained in a 
multiple tortfeasor case must either name the party 
being released or identify the party with some degree 
of specificity. Child, 892 P.2d at 12. 
Because this is not a multiple tortfeasor case, 
the exception in Child and section 78-27-42 does not 
apply here. Rather the common law applies. The 
unambiguous terms of the Release are that it applies to 
Lowell Jensen, his heirs, and "all individuals . . . 
which allegedly could be liable for the above-
referenced accident." Record at 30. Obviously, 
Dorothy Jensen is Lowell Jensen's heir. Furthermore, 
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Dorothy Jensen is the only person that could be liable 
to Mr. Thornock for the accident. 
The Release applies to all persons potentially 
liable for the accident. There is only one person who 
fits this description in this case and that person is 
Dorothy Jensen. Lowell Jensen was not present at the 
accident and was not involved in the accident. Lowell 
Jensen's only connection to the accident was that his 
wife was involved in the accident and she was driving a 
car which carried insurance issued in his name. 
Therefore, the reference in the Release to persons 
liable can only mean Dorothy Jensen. 
Alternatively, Dorothy Jensen is a third-party 
beneficiary of the Release. As noted above, the 
Release identifies Lowell Jensen's heirs and the 
individual allegedly responsible for the accident as a 
beneficiary of the Release. Ms. Jensen is the only 
person to which this language could refer. Therefore, 
she is the specific intended beneficiary of the 
Release. 
Finally, even if the Court were to expand the 
exception created by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 and 
Child to single tortfeasor cases, the Release in this 
case still would apply to Dorothy Jensen. The language 
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of the Release is sufficient to identify Dorothy Jensen 
with "some degree of specificity" as required in Child. 
Child, 892 P.2d at 12. 
B. EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THORNOCK INTENDED TO RELEASE DOROTHY JENSEN 
Even if the Court were to find that the Release is 
ambiguous, there is no issue of material fact regarding 
the parties' intent. The alleged ambiguity here is 
whether the parties intended the Release naming Lowell 
Jensen to include Dorothy Jensen who was the only 
person involved in the accident. Ms. Thornock does not 
argue that she intended to release Lowell Jensen and 
not Dorothy Jensen. She argues that although she 
signed the Release, she never intended to release 
anyone. 
Ms. Thornock's testimony does not make sense. By 
signing the Release she intended to release someone. 
The Release is unambiguous in that it is a Release. 
Furthermore, this testimony does not relate to the 
ambiguity at issue. An ambiguous term in a contract 
does not make all other unambiguous language subject to 
attack from parole evidence. 
The only evidence in the record about the alleged 
ambiguity at issue was that Mr. Lancaster went to Ms. 
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Thornock's home to discuss Ms. Thornock's claims 
against Dorothy Jensen. During that meeting, Ms. 
Thornock signed a Release of liability for claims 
arising from the accident. The parties intended the 
Release to apply to Ms. Thornock's claims against 
Dorothy Jensen. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
Initially, the Court should be aware of the issues 
alluded to in Ms. Thornock's brief that were not raised 
below and therefore are not before this Court. For the 
first time in this case, Thornock now argues that she 
"may have made the mistake of relying upon Lancaster's 
words, and signing something which she did not really 
intend."3 Appellate Brief at 11. Mistake was not 
argued or pleaded below. n[I]n all averments of . . . 
mistake, the circumstances constituting . . . mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 
9(b). Mistake was not pleaded at all, let alone with 
particularity. 
3
 Ms. Thornock's argument is misguided because 
"[t]o permit a party . . . to admit that he signed [a 
contract] but to deny that it expresses the agreement 
he made . . . would absolutely destroy the value of all 
contracts." Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, 
Inc., 234 P.2d 842, 844 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
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Likewise, Ms• Thornock implies that she was 
defrauded into signing the Release. Fraud was not 
argued below. And fraud, like mistake, must be pleaded 
with particularity, id. Fraud was never pleaded. 
Below, Ms. Thornock argued that the Release did 
not apply to Dorothy Jensen because her name did not 
appear in the Release or, in the alternative, that the 
Release was ambiguous resulting in a guestion of fact. 
Record at 36-37, 91-100. These are the only issues 
that Ms. Thornock preserved for review. 
Turning to the Release at issue, "it is still 
axiomatic in contract law that '[p]ersons dealing at 
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own 
terms without the intervention of the courts for the 
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the 
effects of a bad bargain.'" Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 445, 459 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). 
Contracting parties "'should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that . . . may lead to hardship on one 
side.'" Id. "[I]t is not for the court to assume the 
paternalistic role of declaring that one who has freely 
bound himself need not perform because the bargain is 
not favorable." Id. 
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In addition, "*[i]t is a basic rule that the law 
favors settlement of disputes. Such agreements under 
the proper circumstances may be summarily enforced.'" 
John Deere Co., 876 P.2d at 883 (citation omitted). 
"An agreement of compromise and settlement constitutes 
an executory accord. Since an executory accord 
constitutes a valid enforceable contract, basic 
contract principles affect the determination of when a 
settlement agreement should be enforced." Id. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753 
(Utah 1982) (releases are treated just like any other 
contracts under Utah law). The Release at issue was a 
valid contract releasing Dorothy Jensen. 
A. MS. THORNOCK RELEASED DOROTHY JENSEN 
Ms. Thornock identifies Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 
as a "DETERMINATIVE STATUTE" in Section VI of her 
brief, but does not refer to the statute in her 
argument. Rather, she relies entirely on Child v. 
Newsom, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995), a Utah Supreme Court 
decision interpreting section 78-27-42. Neither 
section 78-27-42 nor Child is relevant to the Release 
in this case. 
13 
Section 78-27-42 provides: 
A release given by a person seeking recovery 
to one or more defendants does not discharge 
any other defendant unless the release so 
provides. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 (emphasis added). The plain 
language of section 78-27-42 contemplates a multiple 
tortfeasor situation involving a defendant or group of 
defendants negotiating a release on the one hand and 
"any other defendant" on the other hand.4 The statute 
provides that a release obtained by one defendant or 
group of defendants does not discharge other 
defendants. Thus, section 78-27-42 applies only in 
multiple tortfeasor cases. 
Section 78-27-42 does not apply here because this 
is not a multiple tortfeasor case. Dorothy Jensen is 
the only defendant. She is the only person from whom 
Ms. Thornock was seeking recovery and the only 
defendant from whom she could seek recovery, when Mr. 
Lancaster went to Ms. Thornock's home and when Ms. 
Thornock signed the Release. Because this is not a 
4
 The term "defendant" is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-37 as "any person not immune from suit who 
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person 
seeking recovery." The trial court found that Lowell 
Jensen could not be a defendant because there is no 
basis for liability between Ms. Thornock and Mr. 
Jensen. Record at 70, 105. 
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multiple tortfeasor case, section 78-27-47 has no 
bearing on the Release. 
For the same reasons that section 78-27-47 does 
not apply here, the holding in Child v. Newsom also is 
inapposite. 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995). In Child, Melinda 
Child, a minor, was killed in an automobile accident. 
Id. at 9-10. Child had been a passenger in a vehicle 
driven by Jesse Deller who also was a minor. The 
Deller vehicle had been hit by an oncoming car driven 
by Newsom. Child had a claim against both Deller and 
Newsom. 
Child's father settled with the Dellers and 
executed a release.5 id. After settling with Dellers, 
Child's father filed a wrongful death action against 
Newsom, the driver of the oncoming car. id. Newsom 
sought and obtained summary judgment on grounds that 
the release between Child and Deller also applied to 
Newsom. 
5
 Ms. Thornock points out that the release in 
Child also named the driver's parents from which she 
extrapolates that if the minor driver's parents were 
potential defendants in Child, Lowell Jensen must be a 
potential defendant in this case. Ms. Thornock's logic 
is flawed. Both Lowell and Dorothy Jensen are 
emancipated adults. The is no issue of negligent 
entrustment here. Furthermore, just because the 
Release named the parents does not mean that the 
plaintiff was seeking recovery from the parents. 
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Initially, the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
section 78-27-42 applied to the release because Newsom 
fell within the definition of "any other defendant" in 
the statute. Id. at 10. Because section 78-27-42 
applied, the court determined that the common law rules 
of contract construction did not apply. Instead, the 
court would construe the language of the Release 
narrowly because: 
Holding otherwise would necessarily run 
contrary to the statute's purpose by allowing 
general release language which does not name 
or specially identify a particular tort-
feasor to discharge that tort-feasor. Such 
an approach would effectively perpetuate the 
common law by permitting boilerplate language 
in a release discharging one tort-feasor to 
discharge all other tort-feasors in direct 
opposition to the very statute that was 
enacted to prevent this from occurring. 
Id. The court held that a release obtained by one 
tortfeasor does not release another tortfeasor unless 
the other tortfeasor is identified in the release by 
name or with some degree of specificity. Id. 
Ms. Thornock wants this Court to apply these same 
special standards of contract construction to the 
Release in this case. For section 78-27-42 to apply 
here, however, Ms. Thornock must prove that Lowell 
Jensen was the only defendant from whom she was seeking 
recovery when Mr. Lancaster went to her home and 
16 
obtained the Release and that Dorothy Jensen is another 
defendant from whom Ms. Thornock was not seeking 
recovery at that time. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. 
First, Ms. Thornock was not seeking recovery from 
Lowell Jensen. Lowell Jensen was not involved in the 
accident. In her affidavit, Ms. Thornock refers only 
to Dorothy Jensen. She states that "after the accident 
with Dorothy Jensen, Jim Lancaster came to my 
home . . . " Record at 56. When she signed the 
Release, Ms. Thornock was seeking recovery from Dorothy 
Jensen. 
Second, Lowell Jensen is not a defendant under the 
statute. A "defendant" is "any person not immune from 
suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to 
any person seeking recovery." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
37. There has never been any claim in this case that 
at the time Ms. Thornock signed the Release she 
17 
believed Lowell Jensen to be at fault.6 Indeed, there 
is no basis for any liability between Lowell Jensen and 
Ms. Thornock. There is only one defendant in this 
case, Dorothy Jensen. 
Third, the policy behind section 78-27-42 has no 
application in single tortfeasor case like this one* 
"The statute was designed to retain liability of tort-
feasors and reverse the common law rule 'so that 
release of one joint tort-feasor did not automatically 
release all tort-feasors.'" Child, 892 P.2d at 11. 
Thus, the statute protects the plaintiff in multiple 
tortfeasor cases from inadvertently releasing a 
tortfeasor she did contemplate releasing. This 
reasoning does not apply in a single tortfeasor case 
like this one. 
Because the Release at issue is not governed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 or Child, it is governed by 
common law. The same common law that according to the 
6
 Without any legal or factual basis whatsoever, 
and for the first time in this case, appellant takes 
the position that "Here, Mr. Jensen, as an owner of the 
vehicle driven by his wife, had at lease [sic] some 
exposure to liability." Appellant Brief at 17 
(emphasis in original). As stated in the trial court's 
order, "there is no grounds for any liability between 
Bonnie Thornock and Lowell Jensen." Record at 64. 
Furthermore, Ms. Thornock offered no evidence that she 
was seeking recovery from anyone but Dorothy Jensen. 
18 
Utah Supreme Court in Child allows "general release 
language which does not name or specially identify a 
particular tort-feasor to discharge that tort-feasor." 
Id. at 11. The common law is that "[w]hen the intent 
to relieve a party from liability for alleged 
negligence is clearly and unequivocally expressed in a 
contractual provision, we will enforce that provision." 
Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
The Release clearly and unequivocally expresses an 
intent to relieve Dorothy Jensen of liability. Dorothy 
Jensen falls unambiguously within the language of the 
Release because she is the only individual who 
"allegedly could be liable for the . . . accident." 
Record at 30. There is no other reasonable 
interpretation of this language in the Release. 
Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 
899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995) (Ambiguity is 
demonstrated by contrary reasonable interpretations of 
the suspect language.). The Release extends to Ms. 
Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen in this case. 
19 
At a minimum, Dorothy Jensen is an intended third-
party beneficiary of the Release.7 Palmer v. Davisf 
808 P.2d 128 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). In Palmer, a minor was run over by a 
truck while working on a farm. Id. at 129. The minor 
settled his claims against his employer and entered 
into a release with language nearly identical to that 
in this case: 
The undersigned . . . does by these presents 
release, acquit and forever discharge William 
Borders, Kannarra Partnership, its individual 
partners, Manza, Inc., its officers and 
directors, Keith Schrenk, Justin Anderson, 
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty 
Company, their agents, servants, employees, 
administrators, successors and assigns . . . 
from any and all liabilities, claims, 
demands, causes of action and damages related 
to or associated with that certain incident 
that occurred on or about July 15, 1985, on a 
farm owned by Kannarra Partnership and Manza, 
Inc 
Id. at 129. 
Subsequently, the minor filed suit against Davis 
who was not specially named as one of the parties 
released. Nevertheless, the trial court determined on 
summary judgment that the release applied to Davis. On 
7
 Although not raised below, "this Court will 
affirm" a trial court's grant of a motion for summary 
judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not 
relied on below." Hill, 827 P.2d at 246. 
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appeal, this Court rejected the argument that "Davis 
was not a party to the release and, therefore, cannot 
enforce the Release." id. at 131. Davis responded, 
and the Utah Court of Appeals agreed, that Davis was a 
third-party beneficiary of the release. Id. 
The court explained that only "intended 
beneficiaries" can enforce a contract as a third-party 
beneficiary. Id. Whether a beneficiary was intended 
"must be clear and is to be determined from the terms 
of the contract as well as the surrounding 
circumstances." Id. The court focused on the phrase 
"agents, servants [and] employees" in the general 
release language and found that these terms were 
sufficiently clear to refer to Davis who was an 
employee of one of the named parties. Id. 
Like the release in Palmer, the Release in this 
case identifies Dorothy Jensen as a beneficiary of the 
Release. Ms. Jensen is an heir of her husband. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-101 to -103, 78-11-65. And even more 
specifically, she is the only person that could be 
"liable for the above-referenced accident." Record at 
30. The phrase referring to "all individuals . . . 
which allegedly could be liable for the above-
referenced accident" can have only one meaning in this 
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case, Dorothy Jensen. Record at 30. If nothing else, 
Dorothy Jensen was an intended third-party beneficiary 
of the Release. 
The Palmer case also illustrates that even if this 
Court were to apply the standards in Child to this 
case, the Release language identifies Dorothy Jensen 
with sufficient specificity. Child held that a release 
governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 applies to 
tortfeasors either named in the Release or identified 
in the release with "some degree of specificity." 
Child, 892 P.2d at 12. Certainly, language sufficient 
to identify an intended third-party beneficiary 
satisfies the some-degree-of-specificity requirement in 
Child. 
The Release applies to Lowell Jensen, his heirs, 
and all persons liable for the accident that occurred 
at 90th South and Redwood Road on November 15, 19 93. 
Unlike the release in Child which involved multiple 
tortfeasors, in this case, this language can only mean 
one person, Dorothy Jensen. Although Dorothy Jensen's 
name does not appear in the Release, she is 
unambiguously identified in the Release and is entitled 
to enforce the Release. 
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B. EVEN IF AMBIGUOUS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THORNOCK INTENDED TO RELEASE DOROTHY JENSEN 
"A contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous 
because the parties differ in their interpretation of 
its language." Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer 
Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995). However, 
even if the Release were ambiguous, all extrinsic 
evidence supports summary judgment enforcement of the 
Release. Ms. Thornock argues that the Release is 
ambiguous because Lowell Jensen is named in the Release 
and not his wife Dorothy Jensen. According to Ms. 
Thornock, when Dorothy Jensen claimed that the Release 
applied to her, the Release became ambiguous and a 
finding of ambiguity automatically defeats summary 
judgment. 
Ambiguity, however, does not automatically 
preclude summary judgment and certainly does not 
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preclude summary judgment in this case.8 "Even where 
some ambiguity exists in the contract, resolution of 
the ambiguity is still a question of law for the court, 
unless contradictory evidence is presented to clarify 
the ambiguity." Overson v. United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978) (citation 
8
 Ms. Thornock also claims that in Simonson v. 
Travis
 f the Utah Supreme Court held that ambiguous 
releases are invalid. 728 P.2d 999 (Utah 1986) 
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Ms. Thornock did not 
raise this issue below and therefore waived it. 
Furthermore, Simonson does not hold that ambiguous 
releases are invalid. 
In Simonson, the court found the release to be 
ambiguous so it examined parole evidence. Id. at 1001. 
It found that the parole evidence did not clarify the 
ambiguity, so it construed the ambiguity against the 
drafter of the release. Id. 
Justice Zimmerman dissented because he thought the 
Supreme Court had second guessed the fact finder 
because he believed there was evidence to support the 
trial court's decision. Id. at 1003 (Zimmerman, J. 
dissenting). He explained: 
Here, the release was ambiguous and, 
therefore, parole evidence was properly 
considered in determining the intent of the 
parties. Ambiguity, however, does not equate 
with invalidity. 
Id. In short, "[a] release is a type of contract and 
may generally be enforced or rescinded on the same 
grounds as other contracts." Horgan, 657 P.2d at 753. 
In this case, even if ambiguous, the parole 
evidence offers only one reasonable interpretation. 
The parties released Dorothy Jensen. 
24 
omitted). Although Ms. Thornock argued that the 
Release was ambiguous, she did not offer any 
contradictory evidence to clarify the alleged ambiguity 
she purports to rely upon. 
"To demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions 
must each be a reasonable interpretation of the terms 
in the provision." Willard Pease, 899 P.2d at 772. 
The alleged ambiguity here is whether the parties 
intended the Release that named the non-tortfeasor 
insured to include the driver tortfeasor. Thornock 
does not claim that she intended to release Lowell 
Jensen and not Dorothy Jensen. She claims that she did 
not want to release anyone. 
Ms. Thornock's affidavit testimony that she did 
not intend to release anybody is both unreliable and 
irrelevant. The evidence is unreliable because it 
hopelessly conflicts with the uncontroverted existence 
of the Release which Ms. Thornock admits signing. This 
Court does not consider evidence that is "'clearly 
contrary to some immutable law of physics or is 
hopelessly in conflict with one or more established and 
uncontroverted physical facts.'" State v. Workmanf 852 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
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Ms. Thornock's signature on the Release 
establishes that she intended to release someone. She 
cannot undue her signature through her affidavit. "[A] 
party is bound by the contract which he or she 
voluntarily and knowingly signs." John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 
1208 (Utah 1987). "To permit a party, . . . to admit 
that he signed [a contract] but to deny that it 
expresses the agreement he made . . . would absolutely 
destroy the value of all contracts." Garff Realty Co.r 
234 P.2d at 844 (citation omitted). 
The uncontroverted physical facts are that Ms. 
Thornock signed a Release through which she intended to 
release someone for the accident allegedly caused by 
Dorothy Jensen. Because there is no evidence of any 
other potentially liable "someone", the someone Dorothy 
Jensen intended to release is Dorothy Jensen. 
In addition, Ms. Thornock's "parole evidence" is 
irrelevant because it offers no clarification of the 
alleged ambiguity at issue. The alleged ambiguity is 
not whether the Release exists. The Release exists and 
Ms. Thornock signed it. The alleged ambiguity 
supposedly raises the issue of whether the Release 
applies to Dorothy Jensen. This issue does not open 
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the door to parole evidence attacking the very 
existence of the Release in the first place. Because, 
Ms. Thornock's affidavit offers no clarification of the 
alleged ambiguity, her affidavit testimony is 
irrelevant. 
The only relevant and competent evidence before 
the trial court about the alleged ambiguity was that 
Jim Lancaster went to Ms. Thornock's house to discuss 
her claims against Dorothy Jensen. In exchange for 
$469.00, Ms. Thornock signed the Release understanding 
that it applied to Dorothy Jensen. Even if ambiguous, 
Ms. Thornock produced no evidence to support another 
reasonable interpretation. The uncontroverted evidence 
shows only that the parties intended the Release to 
apply to Ms. Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen. 
X- CONCLUSION 
Whether the trial court's ruling on ambiguity was 
correct or not, its conclusion that the Release applied 
to Dorothy Jensen was correct, and therefore, Appellee 
Dorothy Jensen respectfully requests that this Court 
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affirm the trial court below. 
DATED this >^ > day of March, 1997. 
STRONG & HANNI 
J/oO/I/farw^ 
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER 
KENNETH W. MAXWELL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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XI, ADDENDUM 
Affidavit of Jim Lancaster 
Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster 
Affidavit of Bonnie Thornock 
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Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE THORNOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOROTHY JENSEN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM 
LANCASTER 
Civil No. 960901305-PI 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, Jim Lancaster, having been sworn upon oath, depose as testify as follows: 
1. I am a Resident Casualty Claims Adjustor for Windsor Insurance Group. 
2. In November 1993, Dorothy Jensen, the wife of Lowell Jensen, was involved in 
a motor vehicle accident with Bonnie Thornock. The accident occurred at the intersection of 
90th South and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah. 
3. The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor. 
0 *) 0 ^  n ~ 
4. I contacted Ms. Thornock on November 17, 1993 and met with her that day to 
obtain consent forms to retrieve medical records. 
5. On November 30, 1993,1 had a second conversation with Ms. Thornock in which 
we discussed settlement of her claim. 
6. We agreed that Windsor would pay $169.00 for Ms. Thornock's broken eye 
glasses and $300.00 for out-of-pockets expenses, pain and suffering. 
7. In exchange for the money, Ms. Thornock agreed to and did sign the Release of 
All Claims ("Release"), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1. I explained 
to Ms. Thornock that the Release was a full release of all her claims arising out of the 
November 15 accident. 
8. The Release had a notation that it would not affect the subrogation rights of her 
insurance carrier. 
9. By the Release, in consideration of $469.00, Ms. Thornock 
forever discharge[d] Lowell Jensen . . . and all other persons . . . of an[d] from 
any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, 
loss of service, expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which [Ms. Thornock] 
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way 
growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily 
and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting 
or to result from the accident, casualty or even which occurred on or about the 
15th day of Nov., 1993, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.[,] West Jordan, 
Ut. 
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10. By the Release, Ms. Thornock "specifically . . . releases all individuals . . . 
which allegedly could be liable for the . . . accident, casualty or event." Her specific intention 
was "to release all parties who could be liable for the [accident]." 
11. Ms. Thornock certified when she executed the Release that she understood that 
the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that recovery 
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood 
and agree[d] that [Ms. Thornock] relies wholly upon [her] judgement, belief and 
knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability 
therefore and [the Release] is made without reliance upon any statement or 
representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representatives or 
by any physician or surgeon by them employed. 
12. Ms. Thornock signed the Release in my presence. 
DATED this JK_ day of April, 1996 
Lancaster 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this lh^ day of April, 1996. 
TioS^PtiS"" juuic OOURLEY i r \ Q\) P 
Salt Lake Cfty.Ut^i 84111 . Notarv Public 
My Commission Expires ' nfoiary ruDiic yNovembe« 1.1993 i ^ 
State of Utah j 
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
Know all men by these presents: 
That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration of 
to the undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby 
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge 
and his, her their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations 
or partnerships of an from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses, and 
compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of 
any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof 
resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the /s^ ~~ day of >V o U,_ , 19 
at or near 
r " 
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The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All claims releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or 
partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the 
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same. 
It is understood and agreed that the party or parties hereby released do not consent to this release, admit no liability to the 
undersigned or others, shall not be stopped or otherwise barred from asserting and expressly reserve the right to assert any claim or 
cause of action such party or'parties may have against the undersigned or others. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that 
recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood and agree, that the undersigned relies wholly 
upon the undersigned's judgement, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability therefore 
and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or pa/ties hereby released or their representative or by 
any physician or surgeon by them employed. 
The undersigned further declares and represents that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made 
to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this Release 
are contractual and not a mere recital. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT. 
Signed, sealed and delivered this day of j_ ,19. 
Witness _ _ _ _ 
Witness 
Witness 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
On the 
S.S. 
day of 19 before me personally appeared 
to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and
 m 
has (have) read the foregoing releasee and understand(s) the contents thereof and that 
same. 
My term expires 
acknowledged to me that 
__ voluntarily executed the 
Notary Public 
A r 
Stephen J. Trayner, #4928 
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE THORNOCK, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DOROTHY JENSEN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
) OF JIM LANCASTER 
> Civil No. 960901305-PI 
) Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, Jim Lancaster, having been sworn upon oath, depose and testify as follows: 
1. This affidavits supplements my prior testimony as recorded in Affidavit of Jim 
Lancaster, executed on April 18, 1996. 
2. Dorothy Jensen was involved in an automobile accident with Bonnie Thornock. 
Dorothy Jensen's husband, Lowell Jensen, was not involved in the automobile accident. 
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3. The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured by an insurance policy 
issued by Windsor Insurance Group ("Windsor") under her husband's name, Lowell Jensen. 
4. On November 30, 1993, I met with Bonnie Thornock to discuss settlement of her 
claims arising out of the automobile accident with Dorothy Jensen. I explained to Bonnie 
Thornock that I worked for Windsor, the insurance company which covered Dorothy Jensen at 
the time of the accident, and Windsor wanted to negotiate a settlement with respect to all claims 
Bonnie Thornock might have against Dorothy Jensen. Bonnie Thornock indicated that she 
understood and that she wanted to settle her claims. We agreed to settle Bonnie Thornock's 
claims against Dorothy Jensen for $469.00. 
5. Bonnie Thornock and I had a clear understanding that we were negotiating 
regarding Bonnie Thornock's potential claims against Dorothy Jensen which arose out of the 
accident which occurred at the intersection of "90th South & Redwood Rd., West Jordan, Ut." 
6. I filled out the Release of Claims ("Release") attached to my first affidavit as 
Exhibit 1. I wrote Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because Lowell Jensen is the policy 
holder. 
7. I discussed the terms of the Release with Bonnie Thornock. I explained that the 
Release discharged all claims she might have against Dorothy Jensen which arose out of the 
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accident. Bonnie Thornock indicated that she understood and signed the Release in my presence 
and accepted the settlement check. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 1996. 
Lancaster 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this 7th day of June, 1996. 
lOIB&r' i . c i v . Utah 84111 | 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7^ day of June 1996, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Albert W. Gray 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
3575 South Market Street, #206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
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ALBERT W. GRAY - A6095 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
3575 South Market Street, #206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 966-8111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE THORNOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
DOROTHY JENSEN, ] 
Defendant. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE THORNOCK 
) Civil No. 960901305PI 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Bonnie Thornock, having been sworn upon oath, depose and 
testify as follows: 
1. That I am the plaintiff in this action and was involved 
in a motor vehicle collision with defendant Dorothy Jensen on 
November 17, 1993. 
2. That I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in 
this affidavit. 
3. That in November 1993, after the accident with Dorothy 
Jensen, Jim Lancaster came to my home and offered me $469.00 to pay 
for my eyeglasses and work that I had missed. 
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4. That at the time Mr. Lancaster offered me the money, he 
stated that it was only for the eyeglasses and missed work and at 
no time did he tell me I was releasing all claims. Otherwise I 
would not of signed any papers• 
5. That I never intended to release anyone, especially the 
negligent driver, defendant Dorothy Jensen. 
6. At the time that I was presented with the "release," as 
claimed by Mr. Lancaster, it was entirely blank piece of paper. 
7. At the time Mr. Lancaster visited me at my home and had 
me sign that paper, I was under treatment for my injuries and under 
pain medication. I simply took Mr. Lancaster, at his word, that I 
was signing only for the glasses and work lost up until that time. 
Mr. Lancaster pointed with his finger where I should sign on the 
blank piece of paper. 
DATED this /^ day of June, 1996. 
By 
BOtfNIE THORNOCK 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO before me this IX day of 
June, 1996. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBUC 
KAREN I. MURRAY 
3S7S S Mark* St #206 
WestVafi«y,tJT84ii9 
My Commission Expires 
June 1.1997 
STATE OF UTAH 
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NOTARY PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF BONNIE THORNOCK (Thornock v. Jensen) was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this ^^"^ day of June, 1996, to the following: 
Stephen J, Trayner 
STRONG & HANNI 
#9 Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
WV645.007 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF (Thornock v. Jensen) was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this day of March, 
1997, addressed to the following: 
Nancy Mismash 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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